PUDUKKOTTAI STATE

WAR INFORMATION BUREAU

BULLETIN] FEBRUARY 8, 1941 [No. 30

LECTURE XXX.

LATEST ASPECTS OF WAR IN THE AIR.

THE APPROACHING STORM. The world is immediately facing the greatest crisis it has ever witnessed. The aggressor nations are about to exert their maximum effort to defeat BRITAIN. BRITAIN is standing her ground, cool, calm and courageous.

Before the war, the tendency of British people was to discredit any likelihood of war and to reject any warning of the dangers ahead. Now, the tendency is to read into everything that is done or not done by Germans, some sinister and dangerous design for destroying ENGLAND. This attitude is more satisfactory. It keeps all of us on the alert.

Something must happen within the next sixty to ninety days, we are told. Hitler cannot afford to stand still. The present lull in air raids portends some preparation on a vast scale for the invasion of BRITAIN. The German experts are studying weather conditions and the chances of victory. It is also suggested that in the forthcoming invasion Hitler will use gas.

METEOROLOGICAL RESEARCH. We also have would-be alarming reports of the amount of attention German scientists are giving to forward weather conditions. Though GERMANY has as good and as numerous meteorological stations as BRITAIN, weather changes come generally more from the Atlantic and therefore reach BRITAIN first. This is a distinct advantage to BRITAIN. We have not yet heard any news that GERMANY has set up meteorological stations in FRANCE.

HOW BIG IS THE LUFTWAFFE? It is probably wrong to think as some people do that Hitler will throw the total strength of his Air Force against the British defence. His total strength is reported to be about 35,000 planes, but "total strength" is quite different from "first line strength." Hitler has probably not more than 5,000 to 6,000 planes of "first line strength." "Total strength" includes not only these, but also all kinds of other aircraft such as transport planes, seaplanes, reconnaissance planes and training planes. There would be no use in sending these over to ENGLAND, unless it be to present an easy target to English A. A. guns and fighters. Moreover, if Hitler does decide on mass raids he will certainly regulate the number of planes in each raid, so as not to present a too spacious target to English guns. He will also try to send them in waves in such quick succession that they will be on us before we have recovered from the previous blow.

LIMITATIONS OF BLITZKRIEG. If therefore there is going to be an attack on a gigantic scale, it cannot be by bombers and fighters in tens of thousands! This idea of invasion on a mass-scale is not a new idea. Hitler has tried it out to the limit of prudence and safety once before. It was when he sent over batches of several hundreds, and sometimes even a thousand planes, in the month of August last. He wanted to fulfil his boast of entering LONDON in that month and in two months we knocked down 3,000 of them. Thus we may assume that the first line strength of the *Luftwaffe* will hardly exceed 5,000 or 6,000, and that Hitler is not likely to send the whole of it at once, but will prefer to divide them into a number of waves—say two or three or five. The last figure is the most likely. The efficient tactical control of even 1,000 planes in the air is hardly more than a possibility. Any larger number must get completely out of hand.

NECESSITY OF GROUND SUPPORT. One of the reasons for Hitler's failure in August and September last was his inability to bring into action the new Nazi strategy of co-operation of Air force with mechanised units of Land force. The German tanks did *not* rumble down the English meadows while Goering's eagles were darkening the English sky, and the Spitfires and the English ground defences brought down German planes in hundreds. Hence, Hitler must now aim at landing a force with which to engage the English ground defence units. Behind a wave of hundreds of Dorniers and Heinkels, protected by Messerschmidt 109's and 110's, may come a wave of troop carriers and parachute-troops. This method of landing infantry actually succeeded in POLAND, since by that time the Polish resistance and defence was disorganised. On the other hand in FINLAND the Russian attempt to land parachute-troops was foiled by the alert Finnish troops. The attempt was a failure. It may be assumed that a year later in ENGLAND, Home guards and coastal defence units have very specific instructions about dealing with enemy forces landing by air, as well as from the sea. Sporadic landing-parties will be destroyed swiftly, before they have time to pick themselves up and acquire the requisite cohesion and efficiency to act as an occupying force.

GERMAN PREFERENCE FOR BOMBERS. At the start of the war the Nazis relied almost entirely on bombers. They intended to strike terror into small defenceless nations; and that was what they did in POLAND. But when ENGLAND evolved an efficient system of ground-defence such as her A. A. batteries, to say nothing of filling the air with deadly fighter machines, GERMANY had to overhaul her raiding theories, and send escorts of fighter-planes to protect her bombers.

The M. E. 110's, the German fighter-planes which were designed to meet our Supermarine Spitfires have not proved a great success. They endeavour to approach the enemy from a point which the latter's guns cannot cover. They seldom close to point blank range, relying on the extra range of their cannon, but in banking they were liable to expose their large undefended surfaces to our fighters; and suffered badly for the error. Hence GERMANY's pride is still her bombers.

The tail of a bomber is its most vulnerable portion and the casualties among German rear-gunners are very high. The British bombers have power-operated gun turrets in their tails enabling the gunner to train the machine guns on attacking fighters from whichever direction they may come and whatever manoeuvres the fighters may adopt.

The GERMAN Scientists must certainly be investigating the problem of destroying this fighter-menace, but ours are countering by improving the fighter itself. Crews must have bullet proof armour around them. Petrol tanks must be made fire proof. Fire-power must be improved. The immediate future is likely to show whether the bomber can face fighter opposition and still reach its targets successfully, and the answer to the question will have great bearing on the ultimate predominance of British Air power which we are so confidently promised.

FIGHTER-PLANE THEORIES.

Our interceptive fighters, and for that matter the whole R. A. F., have shown their superiority both in men and in material in every encounter with the enemy. In order to engage our fighters GERMANY produced her Messerschmidt 110's, with huge leak-proof tanks which enabled them to accompany and protect their long-range bombers. There are two economic disadvantages in these tactics. The first is that fast flying Nazi fighters have to adjust their speed to that of the slow bombers they "convoy". Then, when they have to engage the British interceptor-fighters operating near their own bases, and open up their engines to their fullest power, petrol supplies disappear with incredible rapidity! Hence one of the *Luftwaffe*'s problems is to manufacture a fighter for long-range flights with bombers, but at the sametime fly, manoeuvre, climb and fight like our own agile interceptor planes. If it is capacious enough to carry the great fuel load, it is not likely to be particularly good at aerobatics, and Goering has this difficulty to face, as well as the courage and fortitude of his principal enemies.

Generally speaking no fighters accompany British bombers on their long raids. The bombers take care of themselves. Lately, on comparatively near raids on the 'invasion ports', we have sent fighters as well, and most effectively, but long-range bombers are still

unescorted. The Boulten-Paul 'Defiants' are our best machines for intercepting enemy bombers at long distance. They have proved to be splendid fighters in spite of high-capacity fuel-storage.

SUPERIOR BRITISH BOMBER DESIGNS.

British bombers have been made on designs evolved very much later than those of the enemy, after study of the actual problems created by the war in the air. They are more self-sufficient, less dependent on fighter protection. They have mechanically-operated turrets which the enemy bombers do not possess, and in modern air battles, where high speed and quick movements count so greatly and gunners have difficulty in swinging their guns to desired positions, against the screaming air currents, the mechanically operated gun-turret is a distinct advantage.

New tactics or methods in bombing seem to have been devised lately. Dive-bombing, precision bombing and pattern bombing are some of the usual methods, but their objects are very varied. The paralysing of land troops by interruption of communications; the demolition of enemy land bases, as in NORTH AFRICA; the prevention of minelaying by German seaplanes operating from their bases at BORKUM, SYLT, NORDERNEY and so on, by means of "security patrols", are only some of the subsidiary tasks of the Bomber Command.

THE BRITISH MASTER-PLAN.

It was in April 1940, that British bombers were given their first instructions for methodical attack on land targets, and bombing raids on military objectives in GERMANY have gone on ceaselessly, ever since ... ...

In spite of Mr. Baldwin's statement in the House of Commons in October 1932, that "whatever people may say, the bomber will always get through. The only defence is in offence, which means that you will have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy, if you want to save yourselves," we have been led to believe that a consistent plan, punctiliously and exhaustively carried out against enemy production plants, ports, railway junctions, canals and depôts, is the way to ultimate victory. That the Germans could not follow a similar plan, but have descended to indiscriminate bombing of civilian districts, is due mainly to the prowess of our defensive Fighter Force,

MILITARY AND AIR CO-OPERATION.

GERMANY organised its *Luftwaffe* primarily with the intention of using it as an offensive force. So long as it worked in co-operation with the army, as in the offensive over HOLLAND, BELGIUM and FRANCE, it served GERMANY well. Even when it functioned independently as it did in POLAND, it was sometimes effective, since the defence in the air and on the ground was thoroughly disorganised. But when it is a question of being engaged by an air force of equal strength, the result is different. Co-operation with *land* and *sea forces* is vital, and it is a manoeuvre which requires considerable practice, especially if the opposing fighter force is superior to its own. Here the *Luftwaffe* is likely to be generally at a disadvantage, for British interceptor planes, notably the American 'Airo-Cobra', are certainly the fastest and most powerful fighters in the air.

In an invasion overseas naval forces are inevitably involved. And in a naval action, shore-based aircraft can lend vital support in a sea battle, by pursuing, for example, retreating enemy ships, driving them out of the fight, or protecting the bombers while they attempt to sink them.

The Libyan Campaign has recently furnished a brilliant example of naval and aerial co-operation of a different character. In the fall of BARDIA and TOBRUK, the co-ordination of the British bombing attacks, and gunfire from the British battleships, was a deceisive factor in the success of Wavell's land forces. In fact the Libyan campaign will probably be of great interest to the military historian, since that particular battle-area was so suitable for a display of perfect co-ordination between the three components of a modern offensive, viz., Army, Navy and the Air Force.

GERMANY'S MISSING FACTOR.

FOR GERMANY such total co-ordination is impossible, since she has no Navy. The determining factor in GERMANY'S failure at invasion, whatever improvements may be made in her Army and Air Force, may be the lack of Naval co-operation.

She will probably try to overcome this handicap by inventing new uses for the *Luftwaffe.* The issues are (1) transport of men and material by air, and the *avoidance* of naval action and (2) the overwhelming of land opposition, and dislocation of BRITAIN'S defence

services by a swift overwhelming attack by her whole first line air strength—though probably not all at once.

The mass raids of August and September last proved the slightly obvious fact that the larger the number of bombers in a wave, the greater the target presented to our A. A. guns. Added to the difficulties in manoeuvring individual machines, the delay inevitable in formation-manoeuvres is bound to expose the machines to heavier A. A. fire and fighter attacks. Even waves of twenty-five machines were found to furnish a good target to the British guns and fighters. The enemy learnt this by bitter experience when he launched his mass attacks in air. His maximum never exceeded a thousand, and we shall be surprised if in the new 'Blitz' larger formations than 500 are used. If Hitler has 6,000 first line planes, we may expect a dozen or more waves following fairly swiftly upon one another.

WHAT THE LUFTWAFFE WILL MEET.

The principal object of the Fighter Command is to defend the 'home base'. As Liddel Hart has rightly insisted, the security of the 'home base' is the first and most essential item in any strategic programme. We can be confident. In the first Battle for BRITAIN, the fighters came off with flying colours. In that first illuminating crisis the Hurricanes and Spitfires incontestably proved their worth. And neither Hurricane nor Spitfire is the final entry in the studbook of our bloodstock in the air. The record of the Boulton-Paul 'Defiant' is equally splendid. On the 29th of May 1940, they shot down 38 victims, of which 16 were M. E. 110's, one M. E. 109, and 21 bombers. On the memorable 15th of August, 180 German aircraft were destroyed, in one day. We may expect that record 'bag' to be well beaten in the near future, unless the *Luftwaffe* have something very special up their sleeves!

THE MAN BEHIND THE GUN.

So far we have merely discussed machines. But the men who fly those machines are an even more important factor. Last year R.A.F. youngsters established a personal superiority over the enemy, when they were vastly outnumbered. When our aircraft production rises to peak, and there are as many British and American machines in the air, as Hitler has yet shown or can then produce (his factories have already

passed their peak production) we shall still have pilots and more pilots, and then reserve pilots, to fly every machine in an air-armada. It is no fluke that our far-sighted leaders entered on a great Imperial air-training scheme directly war broke out 18 months ago.

And so when Hitler, fearful of the future, conscious of the ever-increasing powers of the Allies, makes his desperate attempt to forestall fate, you may take it that in the Air at least he will meet more than his match.

APPENDIX.

THE REAL THING.

HOW R. A. F. STRIKE AT THEIR OBJECTIVES
SAMPLE OF FUTURE DESTRUCTION
PLANNED ATTACK ON MILITARY TARGETS

by

Wing Commander L. V. Fraser.

OUTSTANDING significance is to be attached to all recent reports of R. A. F. raids on Germany's war material supplies, production plants and transport which are proceeding relentlessly and steadily increasing in weight as Britain's resources in men, machines and munitions mount ever higher.

I have been able to secure details of one particular raid which shows vividly the result of this increasing offensive. It was made by a group that has already done something like 6,000 sorties. The attack was on one oil supply base in enemy hands. Just before midnight, the first aircraft reached the target and the crew dropped incendiaries and high explosive bombs. Great bursts and fires followed. Then other planes came in and the target was set well alight. Within ten minutes other aircraft dropped bombs on the target causing even larger fires. Ten minutes later the next raider dropped two sticks; the first fell along the length of the large target setting fire to the oil storage tanks. Before he was gone, another captain gave his observer a chance and two sticks were dropped with incendiaries on the same area. Fires were caused which guided yet another captain who was circling before attack. Two more sticks with high explosives and a number of incendiaries added to the increasing damage and fires. Another machine followed. It was rewarded by an explosion which caused a column of smoke nearly a mile high the resulting blaze being visible from 100 miles. Shortly afterwards, an incoming aircraft saw that four massive oil containers

were blazing furiously while four others were beginning to blaze. Explosives followed and before the last raider left, **the target was completely alight. Smoke rose more than a mile, split by violent explosions.**

On another occasion, some aluminium works were the objectives. They were nearly 700 miles from the British base. Again fire was caused by the leading aircraft. The second raider dropped a stick of bombs which caused fires with green flames. Shortly afterwards, other aircraft came in causing explosions and more fires. Then for a period of nearly an hour, pilots with definite instructions came one after another to make sure of the complete devastation of the target. The observers saw factories, buildings and chimney stacks crumple and fall, with flames bright as burning magnesium covering the target area. The raid was timed to end at one o'clock in the morning. **On the minute the last bombs were slipped into the centre of the target hitting a hydro-electric plant. The aluminium works were practically finished.**

That is war bombing as seen by R. A. F. It is not the "total" warfare of the *Luftwaffe*. It is the "military" warfare of men who know where, when and why to hit. Theirs is no "tip and run" mission. Before the raids take place, every scrap of information has been collected and new photographs taken of the target, often only a few hours before. Then with the regularity of main line expresses, the bombers leave, fly over their course and arrive over the objective to circle round until they are certain of their position and individual target on targets. Bombs and incendiaries are released; all this precision is due to co-ordination and training. A raid on Brest in bad weather in the second week of January **resulted in 92 per cent. of the total strength of the raiding force reaching the precise target. The observers returned after the raid to report "Bombs dropped across the observed target".** The damage inflicted was great, but the outstanding feature of this raid, which is repeated in countless cases, was **the precision of the attack.** The enemy were using the French port for operations against Britain and her shipping.

It is so in the case of Hamburg, Bremen, Mannheim, to forget for the moment the well known name Hamm. Take Mannheim. Some of the most serious damage the R. A. F. have yet done was the result of a raid on

Mannheim early in December. The main station was hit, five loaded barges were sunk in the harbour and the freight station was so badly damaged that the Postal Sorting Office for mails from German troops in France, which was housed there, had to be transferred to Stuttgart. Most important of all, **the railway linking Mannheim and Ludwigshafen across the Rhine was cut** and all traffic going by this route to France had to be diverted via Karlsruhe. **This is one of the main rail routes between Germany and occupied France, besides being a vital route for traffic from North to South, such as the coal traffic to Italy.** In Mannheim, as everywhere else where the R. A. F. bomb, there was a nice exactitude of objective and area.

The weight of the attack carried out by the R. A. F. over Germany increases all the time. Every day comes the news that they have gone further afield, further beyond the Alps, and deeper into the heart of Germany. Yet these distant raids, damaging as they are, are only samples of the destruction that will one day be wrought at the other end of Europe, when German factories vainly hidden in the east, will be as remorselessly attacked as the factories of the Ruhr.

WEEKLY WAR SUMMARY.

30—1—41 to 5—2—41.

ERITREA.

THE FALL OF AGORDAT AND BARENTU. The British offensive in this region is directed along parallel lines towards the Red Sea ports of MASSAWA in the north and ASSAB in the south. AGORDAT and BARENTU situated on the railway to MASSAWA fell on February 1 and 2 and CHERAN, 50 miles to the east is threatened. Nearly a quarter of ERITREA has now been occupied.

Indian troops have played a leading part in these operations, and the work of the Indian Sappers and Miners, especially in clearing a gorge-road cut by the retreating enemy, has been greatly appreciated.

LIBYA.

(*a*) *CYRENE*, 50 miles west of DERNA has been taken.

(*b*) *APOLLONIA*, 40 miles in the interior is being evacuated.

(*c*) *EL MECHILI*, a junction south of DERNA has been surrounded.

(*d*) *BARCE* and *CASTEL BENITO* have been bombed. The former stands at the head of a Railway Junction to BENGHAZI and the latter is now an important base in TRIPOLI.

(*e*) *MURZUK*, the capital of the oases at FEZZA, in the heart of the Libyan desert, and an Italian air base for operations against Equatorial West AFRICA, was successively raided by Free French Forces from CHAD, led by General de Larminat. German aircraft are in evidence over LIBYA, evidently to help the Italians in an eleventh hour attempt to stem the British advance to BENGHAZI. The Italians claim to have raided SOLLUM and BARDIA and some British shipping in the North African coast, but we hear of no particular damage.

ABYSSINIA.

EL GUMU, GORAI, and HOBOK, all inside ABYSSINIA have been occupied. The Italians round Lake Tsana continue to be harassed.

ITALIAN SOMALILAND.

British troops have advanced about 40 miles into the country. AISHA on the ADDIS-ABABA—JIBUTI Railway has been bombed.

ALBANIA.

TREBESHENI, a highly important 6000 feet mountain range on the KLISSURA–BERAT–VALONA Road has been occupied by Greek forces.

CHINA.

In regard to the Japanese offensive reported last week in North-East CHINA against a Chinese army of 100,000 men success is claimed by both sides. The Chinese state that the offensive has 'failed' while the Japanese claim to have 'annihilated' the enemy.

AIR-RAIDS.

(*a*) Details of the air raids are given in the appended statements.

(*b*) *AERIAL OPERATIONS* over EUROPE during the week were on a small scale owing to bad weather. BRITAIN was practically raid free. The British raid on WILHELMSHAVEN was one of the severest. Admiral Raeder, chief of the German Naval Staff and General Erhard Milch have already had to warn GERMANY that the R. A. F. raids were growing in intensity, and to explain that the German anti-aircraft defences could not be expected to work miracles.

(*c*) *THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE IN THE AIR.*—Crossing the English Channel on February 2, a squadron of the R.A.F. consisting of about a hundred Spitfires, Hurricanes and bombers carried out an offensive sweep continually over the French coast for twenty-four hours. The German fighters, when they saw the approach of the fighters, sheered off. The British air offensive has begun and the British Bomber Command may hereafter be expected to give GERMANY 'like for like'. As a high R. A. F. Officer put it, in the past the Germans went into the ring and put their heavy weights against bantams and light-weights, but she would now realise that there was another heavy weight also in the ring.

(*d*) *RECONNAISSANCE.*—The sparse German flights during the week over BRITAIN are believed to be reconnaissances leading up to a day and night offensive as they did in October last.

FRANCE.

Hitler's reply to Pétain's Christmas message is reported to be cold. Rumours of Laval's restoration to the Cabinet persist. General Weygand, in a broadcast speech, has exhorted the North Africans to be loyal to Pétain. In spite of dire threats, it still seems that Hitler hesitates to take any drastic steps against FRANCE. As the *Madras Mail* has stated, 'Pétain's position is unique; he is the head of a conquered state in command of an unconquered army'. Here are some opinions regarding the present situation at Vichy.

Alcazar.—GERMANY has no interest in complications.

A.B.C.—GERMANY may be on the verge of a new decision vis-a-vis FRANCE.

The Arriba.—Programmes of national collaboration should be viewed with doubt.

Sunday Express.—A sudden over-running of the whole of FRANCE is possible.

Sunday Times.—The language of the German-controlled PARIS Press amounts to an ultimatum.

The Observer.—There is no doubt that Hitler intends to make a rising bid for the mastery of the Mediterranean.

Rassemblement National Populaire.—Meanwhile a new movement called the National Popular Front, probably intended to coerce or replace Pétain, and certainly Nazi inspired, has been launched, with a five-fold programme.

1. Incorporation of FRANCE in the "New Order",
2. Franco-German exploitation of AFRICA,
3. Purification of the Race,
4. Physical and spiritual resurrection,

and 5. Economic reconstruction.

HITLER'S MEGALOMANIA: THE SPORTSPALAST SPEECH.—'Whom the Gods seek to destroy they first make mad.' An eminent medical specialist in LONDON is of the opinion that Hitler is suffering from a disease called 'general paralysis of the insane' which, while it stimulates the brain for a time to an extraordinary extent, brings on also insanity and early death.

However that be, Hitler's Sportspalast speech on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of his coming into power, is mere drivel, a compound of his usual falsities, threats and theatricalities.

Here are a few examples :—

(*a*) False statements.

1. GERMANY was never defeated in the last war.
2. The Nazi party was built purely by persuasion.
3. He (Hitler) never had a single point of dispute with BRITAIN.
4. The Italian people cannot be separated from the Duce 'because of a few misfortunes'!

(*b*) Threats.

1. When the hour strikes we shall deal decisive blows.
2. Every ship (including American ?) that comes near our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed.

(*c*) Theatricality.—After the speech Dr. Goebbels shouted "Command my Fuehrer! We obey and shall follow you!" 'Comradely greetings' arrived at that moment from Mussolini, and Hitler replied that GERMANY stood 'shoulder to shoulder with our friendly ally'!

AMERICA.

(*a*) *LEASE AND LEND BILL.* (*AMENDMENTS*)

The Foreign Affairs Committee rejected an amendment to limit the help to BRITAIN to 2,000 million dollars and voted behind closed doors on three other amendments, (1) fixing June 30, 1943 as the date of expiry for the bill, (2) requiring periodical reports to the Congress and (3) asking the President to consult the Army and Navy before transferring equipment.

Mr. JAMES GERRARD, ex–U. S. Ambassador to GERMANY while giving evidence favoured declaration of war. He feared the German seizure of MEXICO in the event of a British defeat.

COL. FRANK KNOX, giving evidence before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, urged an early passage of the bill in view of the information he had received of long-range weather-forecasts which the Germans were making for an attack on BRITAIN in the spring. The full in German aeroplane production may be due to a search for a new type "which would make existing planes obselete." There was a danger of the UNITED STATES being attacked through CANADA.

LORD HALIFAX, commenting on Col. Knox's evidence, stated that internal conditions in GERMANY, ITALY and the BALKANS necessitated an early offensive being taken by Hitler.

Mr. ADOLF J. SABATH, opening the debate in the House of Representatives, called the bill 'a purely defensive measure.'

Mr. HAMILTON FISH, opposing the bill, feared that it would involve AMERICA in a war in EUROPE and ASIA in six months.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE, stated that the decision of Peace or War vested in one man.

Mr. NORMAN THOMAS, thought that as soon as the bill was passed American troops would have to be sent to EUROPE, ASIA and AFRICA.

Mr. Cordell Hull has asked Mr. Wendell Willkie to hurry back to WASHINGTON in time to give his support.

THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE.

Though there has been no direct export of American goods to GERMANY through RUSSIA, it is now evident that the American exports in 1940 to RUSSIA itself have been in excess of normal. For instance, the export of cotton increased from negligible quantitites to 30,000 tons in 3 months; of copper and brass, to 57,000 tons in 11 months; of wheat, to 10,000 tons again in 11 months, and of oil-drilling machinery to twice the 1938 figure in 8 months; and RUSSIA was under recent Trade Agreement obligations, to supply similar goods to GERMANY.

Large shipments of goods have also been reported from Latin AMERICA to RUSSIA.

Unusual quantitites of tung-oil are now exported from CHINA to RUSSIA; and the exports arriving at LISBON from the Potuguese colonies are also excessive. These commodities are suspected to find their way finally into GERMANY.

Negotiations to stop these leakages are in progress and one of the steps that AMERICA may take will be to license her exports, and freeze foreign funds.

JAPAN.

JAPAN is now playing the role of mediator in the Far-East. French-Indo-China and Thailand have submitted to her arbitration, and have signed an armistice. Vichy must have agreed to Japanese intervention under German pressure. Reports are to hand that Japan, whose sympathies are known to be with Thai, will fix the frontier at the expense of France.

A commission has been appointed to negotiate a long-term Fisheries Convention between Japan and Russia, and arrangements are in progress to transmit Japanese manufactures to Germany through Russia.

The Japanese invitation to the Netherlands East Indies to step into the spider's parlour, designated the 'New Order in East Asia', has not been accepted. The Netherlands Government in London has rejected the offer as likely to affect her independence, but Japan says that she will continue to parley with Batavia, ignoring the Netherlands Government in Britain.

GERMAN-OCCUPIED COUNTRIES.

POLAND has been asked to contribute to German stocks 700,000 tons of grain, in addition to 2,550 million dollars worth of confiscated property. All citizens between the ages of 16 and 50 have been conscripted for German labour. 700, out of 3,000 Polish priests in concentration camps, have been shot.

BRITAIN.

A Joint Committee of the Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of Employers will be set up to advise the Ministry of Labour on matters relating to industrial conscription. Women will be conscripted without distinction, throughout Britain, for the essential industries, single women being called first.

R. A. F. Raids over GERMANY, GERMAN-occupied EUROPE, ITALY, ITALIAN AFRICA and ALBANIA.

Date.	Targets.	Allied aircraft & R. A. F. losses.	Enemy aircraft losses and results of air bombardment.
27—1—41.	**(Monday.)**		
	ALBANIA.		
	Military buildings in ELBASAN ...	No loss.	Heavily damaged.
	ITALIAN AFRICA.		
	Railway stations at CHEREN (ERITREA) and AICHA (ABYSSINIA).	...	...
	A Railway bridge and road east of ADARTE.	...	Bridge damaged.
	The landing ground at APOLLONIA (LIBYA).	...	...
	LIBYAN Seaplane base at BOMBA ...	...	7 Seaplanes.
	Targets in MOYALE area ...	No loss.	A complete wreckage.
	ITALY.		
	The CAPODICHINO aerodrome, the central Railway junction and the marshalling Yard at NAPLES.	...	Fires and explosions started. Buildings damaged.
	The aerodrome at CATANIA ...	...	1 plane.
	Buildings at COMISO ...	...	Destroyed.
28—1—41.	**(Tuesday.)**		
	ALBANIA.		
	The communications in the rear of Italian troops in ALBANIA.	...	...
	ITALIAN AFRICA.		
	Protective fighter patrols over advancing troops.	...	...
29—1—41.	**(Wednesday).**		
	GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.		
	GERMAN Naval Base at WILHELMSHAVEN.	...	Heavily damaged.
	Other places in North-West GERMANY	No loss.	...
	ITALIAN AFRICA.		
	Retreating Italian troops on all fronts.	...	...

Date.	Targets.	Allied aircraft & R. A. F. losses.	Enemy aircraft losses and results of air bombardment.
30—1—41. (Thursday.)			
	ALBANIA.		
	Aerial fight over TEPELENI ...	No loss.	3 planes.
	ITALIAN AFRICA.		
	Aerodromes at BARCE ...	...	Heavily damaged.
	Another aerodrome on the main road between DERNA and BENGHAZI...	...	1 plane shot down. Buildings and hangers hit.
	A bridge on the MEGA-NEGHELLI road.	...	Damaged.
	Enemy posts and buildings at MOYALE.	...	...
	Reconnaissance over LIBYA ...	No loss.	1 plane.
31—1—41. (Friday).			
	ALBANIA.		
	Troops at DUKAJ (near TEPELENI)...	...	...
	ITALIAN AFRICA.		
	Docks, Seaplanes and Shipping in the harbour at TRIPOLI.	...	1 ship set on fire. 2 ships damaged. Fires started.
	Aerodrome, buildings, tents and the barracks at BARCE.	... No loss.	2 planes. Buildings damaged.
	Aircraft on the ground at TERAMNI...	...	3 planes destroyed.
	A transport yard at ASSAB ...	...	...
1—2—41. (Saturday.)			
	ALBANIA.		
	Warehouses, a munition dump and timber depót at VALONA.	...	Many fires started. Buildings hit.
	ITALIAN AFRICA.		
	Store dumps at ASSAB	...	Set on fire.
	Motor transport concentrations at MEGA and IAVELLO.	...	Damaged.
	Aerodromes at ZULA and LEGHENA	...	Buildings set on fire.
	Aircraft on the ground at BARCE	...	2 planes damaged.
	Reconnaissance over the Middle East	No loss.	...

Date.	Targets.	Allied aircraft & R. A. F. losses.	Enemy aircraft losses and results of air bombardment.
2—2—41. (Sunday.)			
	GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.		
	DAY :—		
	Docks and Barges at BOULOGNE	...	Direct hit on barges.
	Aerodromes at OSTEND and BREST	1 plane.	3 planes.
	NIGHT :—		
	Docks at BREST	...	Heavy damage.
	SARDINIA.		
	A power station at SARDINIA	...	...
	ITALIAN AFRICA.		
	The roads between DERNA and BENGHAZI	...	...
	Motor lorries at SLONTA	...	...
	Motor transport at MARAUA and EL GUBBA.	...	Heavy damage.
	Aerodrome, troops and transport at APOLLONIA	...	4 planes.
	Aerial fight over CYRENE	...	1 plane.
	Motor transport and buildings at BARENTO.	...	Buildings hit.
	Motor vehicles at ASMARA	...	Damaged.
	AGORDAT	1 plane.	1 plane.
3—2—41. (Monday.)			
	ITALIAN AFRICA.		
	The aerodrome, motor transport and buildings at CASTEL-BENITO	...	Big fires started. 7 planes on the ground damaged.
	Motor transport near ZANZUR	...	..

Enemy Raids over BRITAIN, BRITISH Territories, GREECE and ALBANIA (under Greek occupation).

Date. Targets.	Enemy aircraft losses.	R. A. F. & Allied aircraft losses and results of air bombardment.
28—1—41. (Tuesday).		
BRITAIN.		
DAY :—		
South-coast and South-East ENGLAND.	...	Only a few casualties. A little damage.
LONDON (4 alerts) ...	...	Slight damage.
NIGHT :—		
Two towns in Western and South-West ENGLAND; **One town** in South WALES.	...	...
MEDITERRANEAN.		
MALTA ...	...	No damage.
ALBANIA.		
Aerial fight over the source of SKUMBI river.	1 plane.	Driven away to ELBASAN.
Greek communications in the rear. ...	...	...
GREECE.		
The Railway station and the railway running towards SALONIKA at FLORINA.	...	...
29—1—41. (Wednesday).		
BRITAIN.		
NIGHT :—		
LONDON area ...	...	Slight damage.
30—1—41. (Thursday.)		
BRITAIN.		
DAY :—		
LONDON area; **parts of** South-East ENGLAND and East ANGLIA.	...	Some houses damaged. A few casualties.
DOVER and ESSEX ...	1 plane.	...
NIGHT :—		
No air activity anywhere. ...	...	...

Date.	Targets.	Enemy aircraft losses.	R. A. F. & Allied aircraft losses and results of air bombardment.
30—1—41. (**Thursday.**)—*cont.*			
	LIBYA.		
	British troops on the DERNA road ...	...	No damage.
	MEDITERRANEAN.		
	SUEZ CANAL area ...	...	No casualties.
31—1—41. (**Friday.**)			
	BRITAIN.		
DAY :—			
	LONDON area and an East ANGLIAN **town.**	...	Building damaged. Fires started. Only a few casualties.
NIGHT :—			
	No air raid to-night ...	...	...
1—2—41. (**Saturday.**)			
	BRITAIN.		
DAY :—			
	A town in East ANGLIA ...	...	A few casualties.
NIGHT :—			
	No air activity ...	...	...
	MEDITERRANEAN.		
	Reconnaissance over MALTA ...	2 planes.	No bombs dropped.
2—2—41. (**Sunday.**)			
	BRITAIN.		
	No air raid throughout BRITAIN ...	...	...
3—2—41. (**Monday**).			
	BRITAIN.		
DAY :—			
	Several places in LONDON, East ANGLIA and KENT.	...	Slight damage. A few killed.
EVENING :—			
	An East MIDLANDS town; **points** in East ANGLIA and WALES.	...	Only slight damage.
NIGHT :—			
	LONDON and **two places** in Eastern ENGLAND.	...	No serious damage. No casualties.
	MEDITERRANEAN.		
	MALTA ...	...	Driven away.

SIDE LIGHTS.

The Sortie in the Mediterranean. The German and Italian papers made a tremendous song and dance about their air attack on our Mediterranean convoy in the Straits of Sicily. Their claims were soon seen to be fantastic, but the old 'Bomber *versus* Battleship' controversy got a new lease of life. Why should it ? As Lord Chatfield could say, deliberately, shortly afterwards, "the outstanding lesson of this war is that ships can still command the sea." Look at the nett results.

(i) To have to leave a sudden attack, in the narrowest part of the Sea, after seven months (since FRANCE went out of the war), to the hated Germans, can't have given the Italians much of a fillip.

(ii) An attempt was made to stop a convoy and cripple its escort in the most favourable possible place. Neither object was successful. Every ship of the convoy with valuable supplies for the Greeks, got to its destination. To damage an aircraft-carrier and a destroyer, and to set on fire a cruiser which became a total loss under our own gun fire, costs the Germans twelve bombing-planes, plus a destroyer.

(iii) The effective weapon of surprise had its edge blunted, in that the R. A. F. were able almost at once to give back a good deal more than we got. The figure of enemy aircraft destroyed almost immediately afterwards at CATANIA, (the lair whence the *Luftwaffe* sprang upon the convoy), grows with each report. 40 to 50 is the latest number. At any rate, enemy air losses in the Mediterranean in and since that affair are EIGHT TIMES OURS.

(iv) The damage to our ships was done by dive-bombers not torpedo-carriers ; there was no co-ordination between the *Luftwaffe* and naval units, such as has been so brilliantly exhibited between our air and sea forces in the last two months. So our naval units-cum kite-barrage-cum-balloon-barrage system of escort for merchantmen, is still good enough to get its charges safely to port.

The Luftwaffe split. The Germans were at it for seven continuous hours in this scrap. This almost certainly means that the total number, (and that a large one), of German machines available were used.

The *Luftwaffe*, therefore, is now fighting on two fronts.

The sortie led to extremely heavy casualties in machines. Now that the aerodromes are known, repairs to those machines will be extremely difficult; moreover all ammunition, bombs, torpedoes, spare parts, and probably oil and petrol will have to come all the way from GERMANY.

We may also surmise that the stories that SICILY is swarming with German airmen and technicians have been carefully put about to dissuade us from sending convoys through the narrows; just as we may be sure that if this *is* the case, we shall be giving SICILY something to think about from the air, which will not exactly ingratiate the Germans with the Sicilians.

A Geographical note. There are one or two other more general deductions to be drawn from this engagement. The first is that by the time our convoy had steamed less than 250 miles under fire, the attack had to be broken off. Concentrated dive-bombing can only be carried out when one side has a shore base on narrow waters (while the other has no land aerodrome within those comparatively few miles from which to retaliate) and then not for very far. (The German 'Stuka', for instance, obviously has this low flying range).

Within these limits, however, a surprise attack from the air is bound to be dangerous. Let us see just where, therefore, there are such likely spots. Excluding the FAR EAST, there are remarkably few:—The English Channel, the Sound and the Kiel Canal, several Straits in the Caribbean Sea, the Panama Canal, the Straits of Malacca, the Torres Straits, the Gulf of Oman, the Suez Canal, the Bosphorus, the Straits of Otranto, of Messina, of Sicily and of Gibralter. The mouths of the Black Sea, the Adriatic and the central passage of the Mediterranean, being subordinate to the gateways of the Mediterranean itself, it is an intersting and comforting fact that ALL THE KEY NARROWS OF THE WORLD'S OCEANS ARE COMMANDED BY THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OR AMERICA—except only the entrance to the Baltic.

Before the Storm. Compare the weeks we are now going through with those slightly later in the spring of last year. The same tense expectancy, the same miasma of speculation, the same longing for GERMANY to get a move on with what she *IS* going to do—but a *far* more confident feeling now that whatever she does, she'll wish she hadn't tried it.

Last year it was "will it be, BELGIUM, or HOLLAND, or SWITZERLAND, or the Maginot Line?" This year it is:—

(*a*) Will Hitler strike through BULGARIA at SALONIKA or through YUGOSLAVIA and NORTHERN ALBANIA, to save the Italians from the Greeks?

(*b*) Has he already begun the 'peaceful penetration' of ITALY and if it can't be peaceful, will he use open force ?

(*c*) Has he got a bundobast with RUSSIA, or does he mean to filch the oil and grain of the Black Sea countries from them, without a 'by your leave' ?

(*d*) Does he contemplate an invasion of BRITAIN, *via* EIRE, with or without combining such an attempt with a march through SPAIN to seize the Portuguese Atlantic ports ?

(*e*) Will he overawe FRANCE, by threats of occupying her remaining continental territory, or of retaliation upon the two million hostages he holds, into handing over her Fleet, the Port of BIZERTA and her Colonial possessions in NORTH AFRICA ?

Hitler *appears* to have a wide choice—and it is part of his game to persuade the world, especially nervous neutrals, that he actually can bring off any or all of these ventures, at will. He wants to *mystify* the whole continent, *frighten* the BALKANS, *impress* RUSSIA, and perhaps *mislead* BRITAIN into a change of strategy.

The other side of the Picture. *Re.* (*a*) *above.* Hitler may pounce, or he may wait. The number of German troops in RUMANIA has been published as 600,000 but reliable reports make it nearer 130,000. There is evidence that he plans a bridgehead over the Danube between RUSCHCHUK and NICOPOLIS, and Railway transport offices have suddenly increased in HUNGARY. BUT—the weather is foul, and BULGARIA is boggy. If it were still frozen, it would be an easier matter. Moreover, Hitler's offer to mediate between GREECE and ITALY was promptly turned down by Metaxas. IF the Italians do a bit better, Hitler may still have hopes here, but all depends on (a) weather and (b) the Greeks, who are doing well enough in all conscience !

Re. (*b*) See our notes in this column last week. Both the Italians and the Sicilians were taught at school to loathe and fear the Germans. They will not like them any the better, Axis or no Axis, if there is yet another 'Hun invasion'.

Re. (*c*) RUSSIA has two *natural* enemies, the Germans and the Japanese. She has so far refused to obey Hitler's hint to make friends with the Japanese, but she has far too untried an army and air force to risk a war on both these fronts. She is aware of GERMANY's strength, and more than aware of her ambitions in the BALKANS and the NEAR EAST, so instead of challenging

GERMANY's ready might, she makes *nam kewasti* (more or less) trade agreements,—AND keeps ENGLAND at arm's length. Yet she *feverishly* re-arming. Against whom? The Democracies, who are all comfortably distant from her, or against...?

Re. (*d*) BRITAIN now has an avowed industrial ally in the U. S. A. Before the stream of American assistance grows to a flood, Hitler MUST try and knock ENGLAND out. That, if we are to believe the Services, the Trade Unions, and the Man in the Street, is just what the British are hoping he will try. It will bring the war to an end sooner. The defeat of one great invasion attempt is a good enough augury for the next... The attempt may be more vicious and ingenious, but we have grown infinitely stronger since September, and are completely confident. As to SPAIN, all that we have heard recently points to her unwillingness to be dragged at the German chariot wheel, even to the point of safeguarding her interests in NORTH AFRICA on her own.

Re. (*e*) You had better listen to the wireless every day now. Pétain is having a rough time, but there is no doubt that he is still insisting on German adherence to the original armistice terms, that a great part of FRANCE is behind him, that Admiral Leahy has given him impressive advice from AMERICA, and finally that he is playing for time, and playing rather well.

Ourselves. It may seem a far cry from the scene of these vast possibilities to a small State in SOUTH INDIA. Yet it is very necessary that we should realise that we, in PUDUKKOTTAI, are also facing the greatest crisis in the world's history, and that our happiness or our doom are as much involved as are those of BRITAIN, or FRANCE or GERMANY or the BALKANS or JAPAN or AMERICA. In NORTH AFRICA, General Wavell has removed a danger to INDIA, and us, that was immediate in June last. ITALY is being hammered on two fronts and is in a bad way. BUT THIS IS ONLY THE BEGINNING OF THE HARD ROAD TO SECURITY. The German military machine is enormous; the German is a much more formidable man at arms than the Italian. The Nazis have seven million men under arms in EUROPE, the biggest army in the world. A move into the BALKANS threatens TURKEY. *Turkey is a frontier of India.*

On no account then should we lose interest, become complacent, or grow slack in support of British and Indian and Pudukkottian War Effort. EFFORT well-directed, honestly carried out, MUST be the central factor of our lives, for a long time yet. Not only honour and decency, but hard necessity demands this—of every Pudukkottian, man, woman, and child.

GENERAL DE GAULLE ON PROGRESS OF THE WAR

WHAT LIBYAN ADVANCE PROVES
OUTLOOK IN SYRIA
FREE FRENCH LEADER'S MESSAGE TO INDIA

by

T. A. Raman.

"PLEASANT but decidedly dominating" would be a good description of the personality of the Leader of Free Frenchmen. He radiates strength of body and mind.

Evident too is the singleness of his faith and the austerity of his bearing. His language is precise, direct and succinct. In personal conversation, too, he speaks with extraordinary deliberation. Half a dozen questions extract from him exactly a dozen sentences. Speculation does not interest him—essentially a man of action he has no time for personal reminiscences. Performance—not prophecy—is his rôle.

When he received me, I broached the subject of recent happenings in Vichy and tried to get him to comment on one or other of the speculations and theories flying about. The General listened silently and summed up with an air of finality as follows:

"What is happening in Vichy indicates a re-awakening of conscience in the case of some men.

"In the people of France I have the completest faith and nothing will ever shake it. From all my reports **it is clear that France is recovering.**"

"From the shock of collapse?" I interrupted.

"No", replied the General emphatically, "Not collapse. France did not collapse, although the Administration did. **To-day people are recovering from the blow of military defeat and are making for a new national unity**. But re-awakened France, I am convinced, is not going to be led to liberty by the schemers in Vichy."

We discussed the Middle Eastern position with special reference to Syria.

"Syria", said the General, "is one of the most complex part of the world, with varieties of race, religion and interests. Despite this complexity, the country has up to now been able to maintain her freedom and a certain balance.

"The triumph of our enemies would mean the complete destruction, to all intents, of Syria, for Nazi ideology is instant death to such a nation.

"To prevent a German victory is Syria's primary need and I have the completest confidence that if the enemy attempts to move into the country, **the troops and the entire population will at once go over to us.**"

"Libya?" answered General de Gaulle. "I will make three observations on the British successes there. Firstly—and not because you are an Indian—**I am particularly happy to pay homage to the Indian troops who, shoulder to shoulder with other Empire and French troops, are fighting splendidly.**

"Secondly, the victory in Libya demonstrates the superior quality of the Empire land forces, as already proved at sea, and in the air.

"Thirdly, this is a vindication from our side of the strategy of highly mechanised warfare. The vital importance of the new strategy of land warfare has been most signally demonstrated.

"The same point", continued General de Gaulle, "provides an answer to your question about a general estimate of our prospects."

"I have always stressed the importance of equipment in warfare of this kind and it is preponderance in this direction that will ultimately decide the issue of this war. It is the weight of equipment that tells decisively. Our victory is certain because Great Britain, with all the resources of her Empire and increasing support from the United States, will speedily outdistance German production of the sinews of modern war. **Supremacy of supply is a guarantee of victory.**

"You ask me for a message to India and here is my message which I urge with all my heart. I feel and believe fervently that this war is a criterion for all people all over the world. **The future of every nation will be determined by the part she plays in this war. In this struggle India is in a position to do a great deal.** I will not say more than that."

With that General de Gaulle rose abruptly, shook hands with a smile and said: "Good luck to you and your country."

"Vive la France!," I replied.

"Thank you", he replied. Before the door closed behind me, he was absorbed in an order paper which had come in during the conversation.

FREE FRENCHMEN.

MARSEILLES FIGHTS ON
HOW FRENCH SAILORS JOIN BRITISH NAVY
TOWNSFOLK'S ATTITUDE TO GERMANS

The latest copy of the "Chicago Daily News" received in India contains the following article:—

DESPITE five months of Nazi domination, Marseilles—France's major southern seaport—**still supplies men to the British Navy.** Many seamen of the once proud French fleet have refused to quit the fight with Germany.

This is common knowledge along the waterfront. Roughly, here is the procedure :

At a prearranged signal a British warship moves quietly inshore in the dead of night. From a dozen coves along the coast the Frenchmen put out stealthily in small boats. Well out of view of any Gestapo agent, they transfer to a British launch.

In a few hours they have been assigned to posts with the western Mediterranean fleet and are working hard to learn the ways of the "limey" and the secrets of the Royal Navy's gun mechanisms.

Thus do the seafaring men of Marseilles express their hatred for the Germans and the Vichy government. The sentiment of the other citizens is overwhelmingly the same and they find equally direct ways of expressing it.

Quartered at the palatial Hotel de Noailles are scores of German agents who followed the tide of refugees in mid-May. These Germans find it wiser to wear civilian dress and to move inconspicuously. **For this is the way a Frenchman greets a Nazi in Marseilles : first with a wide-eyed stare, as if the German were some strange animal ; them with a slow smile, a smile that lasts until the man has passed out of sight.**

SAVING A SUPPLY OF FATS.

One day the soap manufacturers learned that their six months' store of fats, intended as a reserve for French consumers of soap, was to be requisitioned by the Germans. Mysteriously that night the viaduct at Laroche-Foran was blown up, blocking the one railway line from Marseilles through Switzerland to Germany. The fat supply remains in Marseilles !

If a Marseilles citizen can be reasonably sure that you are not an agent of the Vichy government or of the Gestapo, he will quickly unburden his contempt for his present rulers.

THEY DISTRUST PETAIN CABINET.

Since none of the Petain cabinet hails from the south of France, the Marseilles people would naturally distrust them. For 70 years they have aligned themselves with southern-born liberals like Blum. Consequently they suspect Petain's marked indulgence toward the monarchists of the Charles Maurras type, as proof of anti-republicanism. And they are not too confident that the aged marshal would not like to see the Comte de Paris restored to the throne.

The frank hatred in Marseilles for the Laval coterie is matched only by the oft-expressed contempt for the rightist type of officer who raced in the retreat of his soldiers when the Nazis advanced on Paris.

In the war months Marseilles saw little actual bloodshed. The harbour was bombed twice, but beyond that the city's hardships have been chiefly economic.

Of the 700,000 inhabitants 20,000 workers are now jobless. Shipping has dropped from 100,000 tons a week to 10,000 tons, and this mostly is short haul to Tunis and Algiers. An Italian customs commission rules the port with iron grip. Traffic must adhere to precise schedules, often requiring that ships sail regardless of whether their cargoes are loaded!

But despite these handicaps the Marseilles people refuse to believe that the war for them is over, that they must submit to collaboration with Germany. It can be said that nowhere in France does the Nazi yoke rest less securely than in Marseilles, the city from which the anthem of the French Republic was named 148 years ago.

(In a note the editor observes:—

This report on Marseilles reaches *The Daily News* through an American who has just returned from an extended stay in France. Based on this observer's exceptional facilities for gauging French opinion, **it represents one of the few uncensored accounts to reach the United States**).

COMMANDER STEPHEN KING-HALL ON TWO IMPORTANT QUESTIONS.

(I) New American Attitude to "Aid to Britain"

(II) Significance of Renewal of Nazi-Soviet Pact

(I)

TRANS-Atlantic questions of co-ordinating the production of all the necessities of war and raising funds to finance defence measures have been occupying a large place in public discussions.

The series **of addresses which President Roosevelt has delivered over the proposals which now await the sanction of Congress write the word "failure" in bold letters across the story of Nazi diplomacy and intrigue.** In particular, these developments show the fallacy of the Axis reasoning that the

American people could be frightened by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan, into isolating themselves from European affairs. Nazi policy had three aims with respect to U. S. A.: (1) to secure the defeat of Mr. Roosevelt whom they rightly judged to be their most powerful and dangerous foe in America; (2) to encourage Isolationist and anti-British feeling with a view to keeping the volume of American aid to Britain down to the minimum; and (3) to encourage Japan in further aggressive action in the Far East, thus focussing American attention on the dangers in that area so as to reduce still further the assistance available to Britain. So far from achieving its purpose, the Nazi diplomacy has forced the American people to **recognise that aggression in the Far East is part and parcel of the struggle in the Western Europe, Albania and North Africa.**

The United States Government has now made it clear that the whole of America's enormous resources will henceforth be at the disposal of the Democracies, **even at the risk of U. S. A., being drawn into war.** Less and less is being heard of the qualification "measures short of war", which, up to a few months ago, was attached to any proposal for granting aid to Britain.

The real test in this war will come between now and the end of 1941. We can continue to withstand Nazi onslaughts throughout the present year. America's aid will ultimately be decisive and time will be on our side. We can hold out. But so long as the British Home front lacks the direction and co-ordination to enable us to achieve our maximum effort, we will run grave and unnecessary risks. We may assume that Hitler is also aware of these facts and that this gives some point to the fresh crop of rumours that new German moves are being planned on a vast scale.

Meanwhile, the American President has set himself to the task of mobilising American industry. In this task he has been confronted with those problems with which we in this country have for some time been painfully familiar: change-over from peacetime to wartime production with a minimum loss of time and with a minimum amount of compulsion of capital and labour. The President has two able assistants who command in a high degree the confidence of their respective spheres, Mr. Knudsen, an industrialist and Mr. Hillman, a Labour leader. Nevertheless, he has found a large section of American industry unwilling to regard production of war supplies as something more than a matter of Government contracts to be undertaken in addition to the normal peacetime activities. Many firms, including some of the largest in the U. S. A., have also been unwilling to make the necessary capital outlays on new plant for fear that at the end of this war those additional equipments will stand idle.

Mr. Roosevelt has shown himself an astute judge of political realities in asking for more sweeping powers than he probably expects or needs, thus

allowing himself some leeway to make concessions without losing the essentials. He has also been very shrewd in letting it appear that his hands are being constantly forced by public opinion in the matter of defence and aid to Britain.

(II)

We recommend our readers not to over-emphasise the imortance of the renewal of the treaty of friendship and trade between Germany and Soviet Russia. This action leaves the situation unchanged. When the original agreement was signed in the summer of 1939, its effect upon the German people was twofold. A small minority feared that the Pact would open the gates of Western Europe to Communism ; the majority, under the influence of Nazi propaganda, regarded the agreement as a great diplomatic success for the Fuehrer, which relieved Germany of the danger of war on two fronts and marked the Western Powers for a certain defeat.

During the last 1½ years since the Pact was signed, there has been disappointment in Germany over the economic help furnished by the Soviet and Nazi leaders have gone out of their way to make the volume of this help appear to the German people much greater than in fact it was. In spite of this partial disillusionment, the renewal of the Pact has been greeted with exultation in the press of Germany and, to a lesser degree, in that of Soviet Russia. Stalin, on his side, is playing for time. The Russian people, as he knows, have no desire for war and there are still opposition groups in the U. S. S. R. who would be quick to take advantage of the Soviet being drawn into a major war to try to oust Stalin from power. **His policy therefore is to make a minimum of concessions which will placate Germany and avoid war if possible,** or at least stave it off as long as he can. Thus the Soviet continues to give Germany a certain limited amount of economic assistance while at the same time strengthening her own defences and endeavouring, through propaganda and intrigue, to counteract German pressure in the Baltic and Balkans. "Our first and principal duty is the greatest possible strengthening of the economic and military strength of our socialist homeland," was the keynote of Kalinin's address last October at the celebrations in connection with the twenty-third anniversary of the Revolution.

Stalin is also anxious to snatch what advantages he can from the troubled situation in Europe. It is to his advantage to see both sides weaken through war. It is apparent from the Soviet press that **the successful British resistance to the German threat and the change in American policy towards the war had made a deep impression upon the people in the Kremlin.** Moreover, the substantial and outright help beginning with the re-opening of the Burma Road which both the United States and Britain have given the Chinese, has also led to an acceleration of Russia's aid to the Chungking Government.

REPORTS OF ITALIAN PEACE MOVES
NEED FOR CAUTION IN ASSESSING FEELERS
MEN WHO MAY REPLACE MUSSOLINI
ONLY REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT CAN SETTLE TERMS

by

Vernon Bartlett in the "News Chronicle."

A report from our Lisbon Correspondent about an impending Italian peace move is all the more interesting because there has for some time been a belief that political leaders of a neighbouring country, Spain, might be asked to undertake the work of mediation.

The Spanish Government is said to have resisted pressing German demands that it should enter the war.

Helped on by hunger and the attitude of the United States, Spain is now rather neutral than "non-belligerent" and is, therefore, a suitable mediator.

While it is advisable to treat reports of an Italian surrender in the near future with the greatest caution there are circumstances which make it more probable than would be the surrender of Germany after a similar series of defeats.

IL DUCE'S OPPONENTS.

While in the case of Germany no alternative to a Nazi Government has yet appeared on the horizon there is a definite and powerful opposition to Mussolini if not to the doctrine of Fascism.

The King himself has no following. At times when he might have checked Fascist excesses, he has thought it wise to busy himself with the collection of coins.

The Crown Prince has shown much more, but not enough, resistance to Mussolini.

The Duke of Aosta, his cousin, has a far greater following. Although he is in Abyssinia, where he has probably enough on his hands, he might easily be called upon to see Italy through peace negotiations and a new phase of her revolution.

He could doubtless count on the support of Marshal Badoglio and a large number of high army officers, as well as on Count Grandi, the former Ambassador in London.

REASONS FOR CAUTION.

The positions and, in some cases, the lives of Fascist leaders would seem to be so dependent on the maintenance of the régime that one might expect them to cling desperately to it, whatever the consequences for the Italian people.

This is one of the arguments in favour of caution in dealing with peace reports. But it is quite possible for these same leaders to come to the conclusion that someone like Count Grandi, who was well known in London, might be able to obtain terms which would allow them—or the less notorious of them—to keep their jobs, or at least their influence behind the scenes.

Presumably the British Government is alive to the dangers of premature negotiations along these lines.

Once Fascism has had to admit defeat and Mussolini's Empire has crumbled **the Italian people will swing very far away from the doctrine which has brought them so much suffering and demands such sacrifices**. How far will depend in part upon the wisdom of the Allies.

"MODERATES"

It is very doubtful whether a Government formed by Count Grandi or some of the "moderate" Fascists would stem the tide. It might very easily happen that the British Government which concluded a peace with such men **would find itself subsequently called upon by them for support against the Italian people** with disastrous results to the democratic cause in general.

A far more representative Italian Government will be necessary if there is not to be a swing from one dangerous extreme to another.

These reports of the Italian desire for peace may be expected to hasten German action in the Mediterranean in one or more of three ways.

(i) The date of advance through the Balkans may have to be put forward.

(ii) Pressure on Marshal Petain to define his attitude towards Germany may be increased.

(iii) Nazi airmen in considerable numbers may be hurried to Italy partly to stiffen the Fascist régime and partly to take possession of the best strategic airfields.

COSMOPOLITANA

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1. "It would be impossible to find a single man who could prove that the Fuehrer had given a single order that was not in accordance with Christ's teaching of showing love towards your neighbour."

(German internal broadcast, Dec. 10, 1940.)

2. "I take it as axiomatic that Britain is going to win."

(*Mr. Wendell Willkie, New York, Jan. 23.*)

3. "When history comes to be written Hitler will be found to have lost the war in June, 1940."

(*Lord Halifax, Washington, Jan. 25.*)

4. "I have complete confidence in you. I know what you have done, and what you will do in future."

(*General Cassels, late C-in-C in India, Farewell message to Indian troops, late Jan.*)

5. "We are playing on our home ground."

(*Indian Army Officer, on Eritrea fighting.*)

6. "Hitler to-day is a man in mortal fear......He is haunted by the looming prospect of failure."

(*Mr. Duff Cooper, Minister of Information, London, late Jan.*)

7. "The return of Germany to the African continent would mean the end of the independence and security of all African states."

(*M. de Vleescauwer, Belgian Minister for Colonies, Capetown, Jan. 27.*)

8. "The demeanour of the people here is magnificent. I have not found anyone downhearted."

(*Mr. Wendell Willkie, London, Jan. 27.*)

9. "The French Fleet will, now and in the future, remain under complete French jurisdiction......The Fleet will defend itself and the Empire against any challenge from any quarter whatsoever."

(*Admiral Darlan, French Navy Minister, Vichy, Feb. 2.*)

10. "There are many indications that the enemy, within a very short time will make a tremendous effort to destroy the British Commonwealth."

(*Mr. Mackenzie King, Canadian Premier, Ottawa, Feb. 2.*)

11. "I would not regard it as a breach of discipline for a Congressman to subscribe to the Red Cross......"

(*Mr. Gandhi, Wardha, Feb. 5.*)

Examples of Misleading Statements in Enemy Broadcasts to India and the Near East for the period January 20—26, 1941.

A.—BROADCASTS IN ENGLISH.

MEDITERRANEAN MUDDLE.

While the Italian radio is at last admitting to its own people that the African situation is becoming increasingly serious, its Berlin counter-part still tells the outside world that General Wavell's Libyan victories do not matter at all, and that the real issue will be decided nearer Britain. In this latter contention Nazi propagandists are merely echoing (without acknowledgment) Mr. Churchill and the other British leaders, but Berlin's attempts to minimise Italy's progressive loss of Libyan territory and bases do not square with earlier Fascist boasts that the Libyan coast was nothing less than Italy's "fourth shore."

Thus the Nazi commentator, Scrutator, inquires with heavy sarcasm (January 22): "What is the difference whether Australian infantry and tanks are camping out in the Egyptian desert or in the sand-hills round Sidi Barrani and Tobruk?"

THE CONVOY GETS THROUGH.

Conveniently forgetting that the much-boomed appearance of the *Luftwaffe* in the Mediterranean has not affected General Wavell's advance in the slightest, Scrutator goes on to boast that a couple of German squadrons have shown the world that England's convoy traffic through the Mediterranean is a sham." Quite apart from the fact that the British have already destroyed at least 80 German warplanes in the Mediterranean—*i.e.*, considerably more than "a couple of squadrons"—it is worth remembering that the important convoy attacked by the Nazis on January 10 subsequently reached Greece intact.

This fact was admitted by the Italians themselves on January 21, when Rome sneered that "**without this British aid, the Greek Army would have to give up the struggle**". With this usual inconsistency, however, the Italian radio went on in the very next paragraph to assert that "**there is great discontent among the Greeks, who are very disappointed at the lack of British support**."

EXPLAINING DEFEAT.

Axis comments on Italy's retreat in the more southerly African sector are equally inept. Thus the Berlin wireless, on January 23, quotes the diplomatic correspondent of the Italian Stefani agency as explaining that Kassala was "voluntarily evacuated by the Italians in order to enable them to prepare more successfully the line of defence which has been chosen by the Italian High Command."

As the Italians are still in full flight through Eritrea, the inference is that their High Command has not yet had time to choose this more successful line of defence.

LABOUR IN BRITAIN—

Lord Haw-Haw, that self-appointed champion of the British working man, gets more and more infuriated as he realizes how firm is the determination of the British working man to defeat Hitler and his evil tribe. Naturally, Haw-Haw's spite vents itself especially upon such great workers' leaders as Mr. Ernest Bevin, who as Minister of Labour is playing an increasing part in Britain's war against Hitlerism.

On January 22, he accuses Mr. Bevin of trying to imitate National Socialism by the introduction into Britain of certain measures of labour compulsion —naively adding, however, that "it would be quite inaccurate to say that there has been compulsion of labour in Germany". Haw-Haw goes on to admit that German labour has been thoroughly controlled from the outset of the war, "but with the fullest regard for the rights and privileges of the workers".

—IN GERMANY.

Just what results Hitler's hounding of German workers has achieved are best told, not by opponents of his régime who have escaped from Germany, but in the cautious words of one of his own high Nazi officials, the President of the Reich Health Administration, who wrote in 1939:

"The extensive introduction of working shifts and the loosening up of the system of safeguarding labour hours through overtime and Sunday work in many enterprises are creating conditions prejudicial to the health of the workers...........We already hear from the medical profession expressions of concern regarding the decline in health conditions, and the frequent occurrence of general nervous disturbances or of disorders of the digestive system. They raise the question whether the demands being made on the human working capacity have not in some cases exceeded the permissible limit."

So much for Hitler's "fullest regard for the rights and the privileges of the workers." And here is a footnote to this inside exposure of German labour conditions; it is a sentence from the *Monthly Bulletin of the National Socialist Party*, Vol. 4, Part 13, 1939, and it reads: "A model factory in the central German industrial area organizes for work a number of men who, **already in their 75th year**, are still capable of productive labour."

OFF THE TARGET.

"Britain", says Berlin (January 26), "has failed to find any effective defence against air attacks on her industrial centres."

Ben Robertson, London correspondent of the New York paper *P. M.*, declared, on his return to America last week, that German bombers had done comparatively little damage to British industry.

"The Coventry story", he said, "was censored, but not because of the amount of damage. **It was censored because of the** *lack* **of damage**. Coventry was in need of a breathing spell. The British knew that, if they told the world that the factories were still running, the Germans would probably come over again at once and have another try............

"**They have since damaged shopping districts in Birmingham, Manchester Bristol, Cardiff and Southampton, but British factories are safe in more secure suburbs.**"

WITHOUT COMMENT!!

"It is evident that the British plutocrats have at long last decided that it is time they did something for the Greeks, who are slaughtering themselves on the altar of British Imperialism". *(Rome Radio—January 24).*

B.—BROADCASTS IN ASIATIC LANGUAGES.

GERMAN DISTORTIONS.

On January 22, the Nazi radio gave in Hindustani an absurdly garbled version of Lord Chatfield's broadcast of the previous day. This is what Lord Chatfield was made to say: "Were it possible for aerial warfare to decide the war, then taking into consideration past events it would be very difficult for the British Empire to survive."

The following, however, is what he actually said: "**The outstanding lesson of this war is that ships can still command the sea,** and in my opinion they will ever do so, for fundamental reasons......Our Empire is a sound affair, and it is not going to perish from air attacks so long as its sons remain true to the type of those who created it."

The Italian radio is seldom willing to be out-done by its Nazi counterpart. In its Arabic broadcast of January 22, Lord Chatfield is further "quoted" as saying that the *Southampton* was the first big naval unit sunk by the enemy. Actually, he had said that the *Southampton* **was the first large ship sunk as the result of an air attack** since the war started.

GERMANS IN RUMANIA.

On January 20, Dr. Goebbels' radio quoted the Rumania Minister for Labour as saying that "Britain is fighting for the perpetuation of her hold on other countries." If by any chance the Rumanian Minister made this statement, we wonder how he would describe present German relations with his own country, which, besides facing continued civil strife culminating in bloody pogroms, is forced to pay £30,000 a day for the privilege of entertaining the German Army within her shrunken frontiers.

PROGRAMME OF LECTURES

OF THE

Pudukkottai State War Information Bureau.

1941—

LECTURE XXX.

February	8, Saturday ...	Town Hall ...	6.30 p. m.
	9, Sunday ...	Kottaikkadu ...	9.45 a. m.
		Muslim Association, Pudukkottai.	5.00 p. m.
		Poovarasakudi ...	5.30 p. m.
	11, Tuesday ...	College (A) English ...	10.25 a. m.
		Rani's School ...	10.25 a. m.
		Nachandupatti ...	5.30 p. m.
		Tirumayyam ...	5.30 p. m.
		Karaiyur ...	5.30 p. m.
	12, Wednesday.	College (B) Tamil ...	10.25 a. m.
		Karambakkudi ...	5.30 p. m.
	13, Thursday ...	Kudumiamalai ...	5.30 p. m.
		Kulipirai ...	5.30 p. m.
	14, Friday ...	C. S. M. School ...	10.00 a. m.

LECTURE XXXI.

15, Saturday ...	Town Hall ...	6.30 p. m.
16, Sunday ...	Avoor ...	9.45 a. m.
	Tirugokarnam ...	5.30 p. m.
17, Monday ...	College (B) Tamil ...	10.25 a. m.
	Rani's School ...	10.25 a. m.
	Ramachandrapuram ...	5.30 p. m.
	Vendampatti ...	5.30 p. m.
18, Tuesday ...	College (A) English ...	10.25 a. m.
	Koppanapatti, Girls' School	5.30 p. m.
	Alangudi ...	5.30 p. m.
19, Wednesday.	Rangiam ...	5.30 p. m.
	Adanakkottai ...	5.30 p. m.
20, Thursday ...	Viralimalai ...	5.30 p. m.
21, Friday ...	C. S. M. School ...	10.00 a. m.

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